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Differences in National Environmental
Standards: The Level-Playing-Field
Dimension
Robert E. Hudec*
One of the many strands of the trade-and-environment debate is a complaint that exports from countries with weak environmental regulations are "unfair." It is argued that producers
in such countries obtain an unfair cost advantage because they
are excused from complying with proper environmental practices. For example, if paper producers are not required to clean
up the water they discharge from their production facilities,
their costs will be lower than those of producers in countries requiring clean discharges. The claim that such cost advantages
are unfair rests on a general normative proposition known as
the "level-playing-field" complaint: competition is unfair whenever foreign producers enjoy any advantage created by their
government that is not equally available to the complaining domestic producers.
A government could satisfy the demand for a level playing
field by removing the perceived cost disadvantage in one of three
ways. First, the government could lower its own environmental
standards. Second, the government could give domestic producers a cash subsidy to cover their environmental compliance
costs. Finally, the government could tax away the foreign producers' cost advantage by imposing customs duties ("eco-duties")
on imports from countries with low environmental standards.
The first two options are problematic. Environmentalists
quite naturally oppose relaxing domestic environmental
standards. Budget problems usually limit the extent to which
subsidies can be granted. Consequently, commercial and environmental interests tend to support eco-duties. From the environmental point of view, eco-duties improve both domestic and
foreign environmental policies. They mollify the competitive
* Melvin C. Steen Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. An earlier
version of this article was delivered as a lecture on April 13, 1995, on the occasion of the author's reappointment to the Steen Professorship.
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concerns of domestic producers and offer economic incentives to
improve environmental standards abroad. Domestic producers
prefer eco-duties because they elicit the least opposition from environmentalists and taxpayers.
Needless to say, governments of countries with low environmental standards do not concede that their lack of environmental regulations creates an unfair advantage. In most cases, they
are developing countries who assert the right to formulate
whatever environmental policies are best suited to their level of
economic development. They therefore object to any trade measures levied on the basis of lower environmental compliance
costs.
This article evaluates the claim that imports from countries
with low environmental standards are unfair.' Part I surveys
recent U.S. legislative proposals that have addressed the levelplaying-field complaint. Part II examines environmental policy
arguments that usually accompany unfairness claims and describes their relationship to unfairness issues. Part III explores
the root concepts of fairness underlying the level-playing-field
1. For an earlier and somewhat differently oriented version of the analysis in this section, see Robert E. Hudec, "Mirror,Mirror,on the Wall": The Concept of Fairness in U.S. Foreign Trade Policy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1990
CONFERENCE OF THE CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 88, 88-110
(1990).
For other recent works exploring the possible meanings of the fairness concept, see Ronald A. Cass and Richard D. Boltuck, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law: The Mirage ofEquitableInternationalCompetition, in 2 FAIR
TRADE

AND

HARMONIZATION:

PREREQUISITES

FOR

FREE

TRADE?

(Jagdish

Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec eds., forthcoming 1996); Kenneth W. Abbott,
Defensive Unfairness: The Normative Structure of Section 301, in 2 FAIR TRADE
AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? (Jagdish Bhagwati and
Robert E. Hudec eds., forthcoming 1996); Robert T. Kudrle, Fairness,Efficiency,
and Opportunism in U.S. Trade and Investment Policy, in 8 NATIONAL COMPETIVENESS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, 153 (1995); Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade - Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labour and the Environment,
(WPS - 32, University of Toronto Law and Economics Working Paper Series,
1994) (on file with author); J. Michael Finger, The Meaning of 'Unfair'in United
States Import Policy, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 35 (1992); John J. Barcelo III,
An Analytical History of GATT Unfair Trade Remedy Law, 14 WORLD ECON.
311 (1991); Susan Hutton & Michael Trebilcock, An EmpiricalStudy of the Application of CanadianAnti-Dumping Laws: A Search for a Normative Rationale, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 123 (1990); Patricia I. Hansen, Defining
Unreasonablenessin InternationalTrade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
96 YALE L.J. 1122 (1987).
On the influence of the fairness concept in U.S. policy, see Jagdish
Bhagwati, PROTECTIONISM chs. 3, 6 (1988); AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM:
AMERICA'S 301 POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati and

Hugh Patrick, eds.,

1990); JAGDISH BHAGwATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT
RISK (Harry Johnson Memorial Lecture, 1990).
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complaint as it appears in current U.S. trade policy debate. Part
IV examines the extent to which the concepts of "subsidy" and
"dumping" in both GATT law and current U.S. trade law can be
applied to imports produced under low environmental standards. Part V looks beyond the level-playing-field norm and
considers other, possibly more discriminating norms that might
justify national differences in environmental standards. A brief
conclusion examines the likely course of future developments.
I.

RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

The legislative solution most frequently proposed to offset
the price advantage of weak environmental regulations is a tax
on imports from the low-standards country. The Copper Bill introduced by Senator DeConcini in 1985 provides an early example of such a "level playing field" proposal. 2 The bill, which did
not pass, imposed duties on copper produced in countries that
"do not employ environmental measures substantially
equivalent to those imposed on [U.S.] copper producers." 3 The
bill fixed the amount of the duty by comparing the import's acwere
tual cost of production to the cost if the foreign producer
4
required to observe U.S. environmental standards.
A 1991 proposal by Senator Baucus targeted countries that
refused to negotiate international environmental standards. 5
Under this proposal, if a country rejected international negotiations and its environmental standards did not meet those of the
United States, the United States would be allowed to impose
countervailing duties on imports from that country. 6 The
United States would have imposed such duties only if three criteria were met: (1) the applicable U.S. environmental standards
must have been scientifically based; (2) the same standards
must have been applied to all competitive domestic production;
and (3) the imported products must have been causing economic
injury to competitive domestic production. 7 The duty would
have set an amount to "offset any economic advantage gained by
2.

S. 353, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-2 (1985).

3. Id. at § 2.
4. Id.
5. Richard Lawrence, GATT Urged to Address Environment,J. COM., Oct.
28, 1991, at 5A.
6. Id.
7. 137 Cong. Rec. S13,169 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (recommendation of
Senator Baucus). See also Baucus Calls for Environmental Code in GATT
Modeled After Subsidies Code, 8 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1568-69 (Oct. 30, 1991).
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producing the product under less stringent environmental protection regulations."
The International Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991, proposed by Senator Boren, would have allowed the United States
to apply countervailing duties to imports produced without "effective pollution controls." 9 The duty based on the cost of complying with U.S. environmental standards. Half of the
countervailing duties collected would have been placed into a
"Pollution Control Export Fund" to help developing countries
purchase U.S. pollution control equipment.' 0 The Boren bill was
not enacted or reintroduced.
A more general Congressional resolution introduced in 1993
called for creating a "fair" world economic system by ensuring
that "[U.S.] laws designed to protect the environment from polluting and environmentally destructive industrial and agricultural practices not place the United States at a competitive
disadvantage compared with other countries."" This resolution
also failed.
Representative Gephardt has advanced the most recent
level-playing-field measure entitled "Blue and Green 301."12
Not yet introduced as a bill, Gephardt's proposal treats any failure to adopt effective environmental safeguards as an unfair
trading practice if it yields a competitive advantage to the polluter. 13 The proposal also allows the United States to impose
unilateral trade sanctions against countries failing to enforce
4
their own environmental and labor laws.'
One academic commentator has suggested an antidumping
approach to the problem. She recommends imposing a dumping
duty equal to the cost "saved" by the exporter in a low-standards
country.' 5 The amount of the duty would be based on the difference between the cost of complying with the importing country's
8.
9.

137 Cong. Rec. at S13,169.
S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991). See also Trade Incentives and
EnvironmentalReform: The Search for a Suitable Incentive, 4 GEo. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 421, 427 (1992).
10. S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1991).
11. H.R. Con. Res. 86 (1993).
12. The colors represent the interests protected by the bill - labor (blue
collar) and the environment (green).
13. Gephardt Bill to Allow Sanctions For Not Enforcing Environmental
Laws, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 500 (Mar. 30, 1994).
14. Id.
15. Ursula Kettlewell, GAT - Will Liberalized Trade Aid Global Environmental Protection? 21 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55, 74-76 (1992).
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environmental regulations and the cost of complying with the
exporting country's regulations.' 6
Another proposed solution to the perceived competitive
problem would remove otherwise available preferential tariff
treatment for products from countries that fail to meet some acceptable standard of environmental regulation. For example,
the Baucus proposal contained a provision making adequate environmental regulation a condition for extending U.S. duty-free
benefits to developing countries.' 7 Similarly, the Global Environmental Protection and Trade Equity Act, introduced by Senators Lautenberg, Kasten and Dixon, would have required that
countries institute and enforce "effective" pollution control programs in order to be eligible for trade preferences under the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).' 8 Representative Brown introduced the
GSP Renewal and Reform Act of 1993 that would have required
countries to comply with internationally recognized environmental protection standards in order to qualify for GSP 20status. 19
Congress has yet to enact any of these GSP proposals.
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CASE FOR A LEVEL
PLAYING FIELD
Although the main focus of the level-playing-field complaint
is commercial, environmental concerns add a new policy dimension. Some environmental writers argue that satisfying the unfairness claims of domestic producers promotes better
environmental policies. If such producers are protected from
foreign competition they may be less likely to oppose higher domestic environmental standards. Environmental advocates also
assert that the threat of eco-duties creates pressure for higher
environmental standards in other countries.
Environmental writers have developed a vocabulary connecting these level-playing-field concerns to other environmen16. Id. at 75.
17. 137 Cong. Rec. S13,170 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991). See also Lawrence,
supra note 5, at 5A.
18. S. 2887, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
19. H.R. 3625, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
20. Section 601 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809,
4990 (1994), extended the existing GSP law, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65 (1994)
through July 31, 1995 to give Congress additional time to consider the longterm fate of the GSP program. The proposed renewal legislation, H.R. 1654,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), contained no environmental conditions. This renewal legislation had not been enacted as of October, 1995.
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Environmentalists once drew attention to the
tal issues.
pollution "spillover" that weak environmental policies caused in
neighboring countries. They argued that pollution that crossed
national frontiers should be treated like any other tortious harm
and that affected countries had a right to take action against the
polluting countries. The term "spillover" acquired so much normative resonance in this context that environmental writers began to use it to describe many other kinds of environmental
concerns. For example, the term "psychological spillover" is
used to support a claim that mistreatment of animals has an
emotional impact on citizens of other countries, an impact that
harms them as much as pollution spillover and thus justifies
similar retaliatory action. 2 ' This same "spillover" vocabulary is
now used to describe the adverse political effects caused by imports from countries with low environmental standards. Such
imports cause "political spillover" when they induce local producers to oppose stronger environmental policies at home.
It is true that domestic producers often cite competitive disadvantage as one reason to object to higher environmental standards at home. Moreover, if domestic producers can feasibly
relocate to a "polluter haven" country, they will usually threaten
to do so. One can never know, however, the extent to which
lower environmental standards abroad actually do contribute to
the substance or intensity of such political positions. Common
sense tells us that there are usually many other factors involved
in perceptions of competitive disadvantage vis-dt-vis imports.
Recent studies indicate that the cost of complying with environmental regulations to date has not been very large. 2 2 Some
skepticism is warranted.
Assuming that discrepancies in environmental policies
cause at least some cost differences and that manufacturers will
call attention to them, the ultimate question is whether these
cost differences deserve to be treated as more important than
the dozens of other cost advantages a foreign producer may
21. See, e.g., Richard Blackhurst & Arvind Sabramanian, Promoting Multilateral Cooperation on the Environment, in THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE
IssuEs 247 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992).
22. See Arik Levinson, EnvironmentalRegulations and Industry Location:
International and Domestic Evidence, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION:
PREREQUISITES TO FREE TRADE?

(Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds.,

forthcoming 1996).
Daniel Esty, while acknowledging the generally low level of current environmental compliance costs, reports a number of estimates showing that averDANIEL C. EsTy, GREENING THE
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 160-61 (1994).

age compliance costs will rise significantly.
GATT:
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have. International trade is based on differences of cost factors.
Local producers will complain about any of them if given a
chance. Unless something is thought to be wrong with a particular cost factor, however, governments do not usually feel obliged
to address such complaints, nor, indeed, do such complaints tend
to be pressed very far in the first place.
In sum, "political spillover" arguments are significant only
to the extent they are supported by some kind of normative complaint. It is the level-playing-field complaint that gives them
what vigor they have today. While environmental writers do
not necessarily endorse the level-playing-field complaint on its
merits (although to be fair most don't exactly oppose it, either),
the strength of their political spillover arguments depends on it.
It would be difficult to complain about the political spillover of
low environmental standards if such standards were generally
perceived to be a normal and legitimate variation between national domestic policies.
III. THE CONCEPT OF FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The concept of fairness in international trade policy is almost entirely a U.S. contribution. No government uses unfair
trade laws as vigorously as does the United States, and the U.S.
Congress bows to no one in its attachment to concepts of fair and
unfair trade. To understand these distinctive U.S. ideas, we
must start by looking into their origins in U.S. economic life.

A.

FAIR COMPETITION IN

U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY

In the United States, the core substantive content of unfairness claims derives from a concept known as "fair competition."
The normative assertion behind the idea of fair competition is
that merit should determine business outcomes. In other words,
businesses should succeed or fail according to their merit as
competitors. Competition will be "fair" if none of the competitors
has any advantages that are not based on merit. Competition
will be fair if the playing field is level.
The concept of fair competition originated in U.S. internal
economic policy. Throughout most of its history, the United
States has maintained a commitment to an open internal economy. U.S. businesses are expected to compete with each other.
The policy is reflected in the U.S. Constitution's Commerce
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Clause, 23 and in the many components of the U.S. antitrust
laws. The primary justification for this policy, of course, is its
beneficial effect on national economic welfare. Over the years,
however, public debate has added the concept of fair competition
as a normative justification for this policy.
The idea of merit-based outcomes has broad popular appeal,
at least in United States politics. The business community itself
has come to welcome the idea, because a fair competition policy
requires that government not intrude in business. The role of
government is merely to make certain that the playing field is
level, by ensuring both that local governments do not tilt the
playing surface and that private parties do not impede competition through cartels or other anti-competitive behavior.
To be sure, the rhetorical image of a level playing field is
somewhat fanciful to the extent that it portrays competitors
grappling for commercial success in some pristine environment
free from external influences. The modern world has never
known such a government-free state of nature. Government is
everywhere. Government presence in the market begins by providing certain very important basic conditions such as law and
order, infrastructure, stable financial markets, and so forth.
The modern state goes much further with economic program
upon economic program, each of which influences the direction
and content of business activity. The concept of fair competition,
therefore, simply cannot exclude government assistance from
the picture. It can make sense, however, in terms of a policy
which excludes all forms of one-sided government assistance. If
everyone receives essentially the same kind and amount of government assistance, as well as the same measure of government-imposed handicaps, no competitor will be advantaged by
government in the end, and so competitive skills will continue to
be the determining factor of commercial success.
"Fair competition" can be achieved in a general way in the
internal U.S. market. Business conditions between domestic
competitors are, for the most part, the same. All businesses are
subject to the same federal government, providing them with the
same type of government benefits and burdens. State governments do differ to some extent, and sometimes differences between states generate business complaints, as in the case of
taxes or labor policy. But the disadvantages of such inter-state
23. The U.S. Constitution states that "Congress shall have Power... to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S.
CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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differences tend to be muted by an underlying acceptance of
business mobility as a relevant option - if you don't like it you
can move. Another leveling element is the fact that businesses
really can compete anywhere within the internal market. No
one has an officially protected market, and antitrust laws limit
the competitive barriers that can be erected privately.
In the rough-and-tumble of business competition, losers will
always want to complain about the unfairness of the process and
there will always be some difference in business conditions to
complain about. Governments cannot run a sensible economic
policy unless they are capable of considerable skepticism toward
such complaints. The internal U.S. market comes equipped with
a considerable supply of such skepticism. Almost all the players
in the competitive contest are represented in the relevant governments, so that every claim of unfair advantage will be tested
by opposing interests. Domestic economic policy is not in fact
swamped with unfairness claims.
On the whole, then, the concept of fair competition works
well enough in the internal U.S. market that most U.S. business
and political leaders make a public commitment to these values.
This is a central part of the normative education they bring to
international trade affairs.
B.

"FAIR COMPETITION" APPLIED TO FOREIGN TRADE

The concept of fair competition found an important role in
United States foreign trade policy after World War II. During
the U.S. economic domination of the 1950s and early 1960s, the
U.S. government and the U.S. business sector utilized the rhetoric of fair competition when demanding entry into protected foreign markets. "Open your doors," they said, "and let the better
competitor win." When the pressure of foreign competition
started to rise in the late 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. business
interests began to speak more softly, but the U.S. government
kept up the rhetoric in an effort to justify an increasingly liberal
trade policy.
The invocation of "fair competition" values justified two important elements of U.S. foreign trade policy. First, and most
obviously, it avoided trade protection. A commitment to fair
competition policy found its way into the U.S. "escape clause"
legislation. 24 The escape clause law declares that, while local
24. The current version of the escape clause, which was substantially rewritten in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, is found at 19
U.S.C. § 2251-53 (1994).
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business may deserve some breathing space when import competition becomes very intense, trade remedies must be temporary. If domestic industry cannot compete in the long run
without extra protection, it should get out of the business.
A second policy consequence of the commitment to fair competition was the practice of not compensating the losers in foreign trade competition. The economic theory of international
trade demonstrates that trade creates welfare gains for society
as a whole, but admits that there will be dislocation costs for
losers. The standard academic answer to the problem of dislocation costs is to use the gains from trade to compensate the losers.
The fair competition approach says "no" to the idea of compensation. It posits that losers deserved to lose because they were just
not good enough competitors. Losers must accept their losses
and move on. That has generally been the U.S. policy.
In order to make "fair competition" a politically credible justification for liberal trade policy, the U.S. government had to acknowledge the existence of "unfair competition" as well and
promise to protect U.S. producers against it. During the early
1970s, the U.S. government almost welcomed increased attention to claims of "unfair" foreign competition because it signaled
acceptance in the business community of the basic policy of
openness toward "fair" foreign competition. By the time of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, it could be said that government
and business had struck a deal: business would accept the policy
of unprotected and uncompensated adjustment to "fair" foreign
competition in5 exchange for effective protection against "unfair"
2
competition.
Unfortunately, the ideas of fair and unfair competition that
make sense to competition within a domestic market do not
make the same kind of sense when applied to international competition. The question of whether international competition is
fair or unfair depends on the net advantage produced by the differing conditions in each country. There is, however, no reliable
way of ascertaining and comparing the net advantage from one
country to another. Foreign and domestic competitors do not
share the same governmental regulatory structures. The burdens and benefits of each government's policy are never identical
25. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979). This
act, which ratified the results of the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations, contained
a complete rewriting of the antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD)
laws, making them tighter in a number of respects. The AD/CVD laws continue
to have a large industry support group, which periodically calls upon Congress
to keep its 1979 pledge to make the AD/CVD laws effective.
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to those in other countries. Moreover, government policies are
so complex that one could never compile a complete list of the
relevant policy measures influencing competitive outcomes in
any one country, much less measure them. Nor can the effects of
these differences be equalized by the mobility of producer investments or by access into the competitor's market, for neither of
these alternatives can be taken for granted in the markets of
other countries.
In short, there is no way to know whether the playing field
is level to begin with. That being so, there is no way to know
whether any particular government measure produces an unfair
advantage. A single advantage, like a subsidy, is unfair only if
one assumes that all other factors are equal. Eliminating a subsidy will produce a level playing field only when the playing field
is otherwise level.
Critics of unfair trade laws welcome this demonstration of
the normative incoherence of such laws, but advocates for liberal
trade policy take no comfort in its unpleasant corollary - the
impossibility of proving that any instance of foreign competition
is fair. Our inability to measure and compare competitive conditions between nations means that the possibility that a foreign
competitor has received greater assistance than the assistance
given by one's own government can never be excluded. This is a
most disturbing truth, for it means that foreign trade can never
be proved to be in compliance with the seemingly all-powerful
normative standard that governs U.S. business and political attitudes toward trade.
A logical response at this point may be for trade policy experts to educate the U.S. business and political community that
(1) the concepts of "fair" and "unfair" cannot be applied to foreign trade, and (2) foreign trade is nonetheless clearly beneficial
to the national welfare even though it is based on different business conditions. But that response has thus far not been made.
Instead, the U.S. trade laws continue to treat foreign trade
as though fairness and unfairness were administrable concepts.
In all probability, the decision to do so was largely unconscious.
Ideas of fairness and unfairness were part of everyone's attitudes toward competition, and the simple momentum of traditional thinking could account for the importation of those ideas
into the relatively unfamiliar domain of international competition. The fact that traditional ideas of fair competition were
quite useful in securing broad political acceptance of trade liberalization no doubt also encouraged this tendency.
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Oddly enough, U.S. trade laws have been reasonably successful in creating the illusion that the law can distinguish between fair and unfair foreign trade. The trade laws simply
identify certain acts such as subsidies and dumping as unfair
and further provide a tariff remedy that "cures" the unfair effects of these practices. By claiming the ability to police unfair
trade, the law implicitly assures the business public that the
rest of foreign trade is fair - something like the way a hanging
assures the public that the streets are safe.
Business attitudes aid this illusion of legal efficacy, because
most business participants are genuinely convinced of the unfairness of certain advantages enjoyed by foreign business.
Fairness is very much a matter of perception, and perceptions
vary considerably according to the eye of the beholder. For the
average business leader, "unfair is what your government does
for you that mine does not do for me." As for the nice things
one's own government does, well, those are just the well-deserved fruits of having a competent government. These intuitive, perhaps even subconscious, sorting operations produce
what feels like genuine convictions of unfairness. Most domestic
producers become genuinely livid about the unfairness of a foreign government subsidy, their minds intuitively closed to the
possibility, for example, that the subsidy does no more than correct for an overvalued exchange rate. It helps, of course, that
the foreign producers to whom these attitudes are directed are
not represented in the political process.
Before rejecting this entire legal edifice as make-believe, we
must give make-believe its due. The U.S. laws on fair and unfair trade attempt to develop a politically acceptable rationale
for a liberal trade policy. Politics is the art of working with the
values and perceptions that people have, to the extent one cannot change them. If public discourse reveals a fairness-unfairness line along which the business community will accept a
healthy degree of free trade, governments can be forgiven for
trying to use, and even enhance, those business perceptions as a
way of promoting sound policy.
The results have been quite satisfying on the whole. The
world is currently experiencing the greatest degree of trade liberalization it has known since the rise of the nation state. We
will never know what would have happened if a more intellectually honest approach had been taken because the success of the
present policy has all but carved these wrong ideas in stone.
For the foreseeable future, U.S. trade policy is condemned to fol-
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low a public religion based on the worship of fairness and unfairness. Trade policy officials will have to make the best policy
they can within the confines of that theology.
C.

LIMITING THE REACH OF FAJRNESS CONCEPTS

The greatest danger posed by the current attachment to
fairness concepts in international trade policy is the possibility
that those concepts will be used to attack almost all foreign
trade. There are many differences between business conditions
from one country to another. We know that there is no way to
measure the net balance of advantage produced by such differences. U.S. trade law tries to circumvent this problem by focusing on one particular advantage at a time, such as a subsidy,
and treating that advantage in isolation. If every advantageous
difference in business conditions between countries were similarly treated in isolation, most if not all foreign trade could be
branded as unfair.
The question is whether a line can be drawn between the
sort of competitive advantage created by things like subsidies,
which have already been declared to be unfair, and the competitive advantage created by other differences in regulatory policy
such as differences in environmental standards. Logically, the
fairness concept underlying these characterizations does not offer a plausible distinction between one source of advantage and
another. Anything that affects competition is potentially unfair.
Happily, however, logic has not been the controlling variable so
far. Governments seem to recognize a practical need to limit
the fairness concept at some point.
The pragmatic concern is simply that a limitless concept of
fairness will destroy a country's exports as well as its imports.
Most countries have a substantial investment in international
trade and are not prepared to suffer the major economic dislocation that would occur if all that trade were cut off. The U.S.
government's commitment to preventing unfair trade was never
intended to threaten this larger interest. To the contrary, the
attention to unfairness emerged primarily as a quid pro quo support for liberal trade policy. Indeed, if the unfairness concept is
viewed from its political origins, it must be seen as necessarily
assuming that the bulk of foreign trade as we know it is fair.
Thus far, it would appear that governments have applied
the unfairness concept with the sort of restraint just suggested.
As will be discussed in the following section, broader ideas of
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subsidy and dumping are rejected whenever they threaten to
produce too many trade restrictions.
To be sure, there is always the possibility that, in the long
run, the idea of unfairness will overpower its creators. Normative concepts like this one do have a capacity to generate their
own growth. It would not be the first time a legal fiction had
grown out of control and destroyed the values it was created to
implement. 26 The main safeguard against this outcome is simply the size of the world's investment in international trade. It
is probably a safe bet that these large money interests will prevail, but it is difficult to be complacent about a political issue
involving anything as potentially volatile as perceptions of
unfairness.
IV. FAIRNESS CONCEPTS IN ACTION:
CAN LOW ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS BE
TREATED AS "SUBSIDIES" OR
"DUMPING"?
The primary legal concepts employed to root out unfair
trade are those of subsidy and dumping. This section considers
how present laws dealing with subsidies and dumping address
low environmental standards. The analysis considers both
GATT and U.S. law.

A. Low

ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AS SUBSIDIES

The most common legal framework for level-playing-field
claims against low environmental standards is the assertion
that such low standards should be treated as a form of subsidy
to producers. The subsidy is the cost saved due to the low environmental standard - the difference between the producer's actual costs and the higher costs it would have incurred if required
to comply with more rigorous environmental standards. GATT
law permits governments to impose "countervailing duties"
(CVDs) on subsidized imports that cause material injury to a domestic industry. The amount of the countervailing duty is equal
to the amount of the subsidy.
Current countervailing duty laws do not seem to provide a
remedy against goods produced in countries with low environ26. The editors have asked for an example. One that comes to mind is the
concept of "benefit" in the law of restitution, originally stretched out of shape to
do justice in cases where the law of contracts failed to do so, and now routinely
employed to give plaintiffs an unjustly excessive measure of damages.
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mental standards. Such a legal claim would fail on several
counts. First, the current definition of "subsidy" does not appear
to include the cost advantage obtained from lower environmental standards. Second, in most cases the benefits of such a subsidy do not meet the requirement that they be "specific" to
certain industries. Finally, it is very difficult to demonstrate,
much less measure, the financial benefit conferred by low environmental standards. Most proposals calling for CVDs against
environmental subsidies concede that new legislation would be
required to impose such a remedy.
New legislation, of course, could remove all these legal
shortcomings in a single stroke. Such legislation could declare
the cost advantage of low environmental standards to be a subsidy, it could waive the specificity requirement, and establish an
arbitrary formula for calculating the size of the subsidy. Such a
law would probably run afoul of GATT obligations, but that has
not always prevented such laws from being enacted.
The core concept of "subsidy" is extremely pliable. The term
normally means the transfer by the government of something of
value to a producer which increases the producer's profitability.
The most common kinds of subsidies involve transfers of money,
goods or services, either for free or at below market prices. But
from an economic viewpoint anything the government does
which alters the producer's costs or revenues in a favorable direction could just as easily be called a subsidy. The political perception is primarily a matter of visibility. Once the helping
hand of government becomes conspicuous, it tends to elicit "subsidy" objections no matter what form the help takes.
Until recently, the concept of subsidy was not defined either
in national law or in GATT. The lack of definition caused no
major problems before the 1970's. The countervailing duty law
was little used, and complaints tended to focus on the ordinary
export subsidies involving financial transfers from government
to business.
Pressure to expand the concept began in the 1970's when
the United States decided to apply CVD law to domestic subsidies. In response, domestic producers complained about more
and more kinds of government assistance. U.S. countervailing
duty law resisted this pressure to expand and began to impose
some limits on the subsidy concept.
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The first major limitation on the subsidy concept was the socalled "specificity" requirement. 2 7 Countervailing duty law was
held inapplicable to any governmental benefits "generally available" to all or most producers. This limitation effectively excluded most government contributions to infrastructure, as well
as most economy-wide social or economic programs. The GATT
subsequently adopted the specificity requirement when it issued
the first formal definition of "subsidy" in the
1994 Uruguay
28
Round revision of the GATT Subsidies Code.
A second major definitional exercise is still in motion. Until
about 1992, the U.S. administrative authorities limited the definition of "subsidy" in U.S. CVD law to transfers of things of
value by the government. The concept included the grant of less
tangible benefits like loan guarantees, but stopped short of recognizing indirect financial benefits that sometimes result from
regulatory measures, such as lower input prices that certain
producers obtain from an export restriction on the raw materials
they use. In 1992, the U.S. Department of Commerce explicitly
rejected its previous definition of subsidy in the Softwood Lumber III case. 29 The Department determined that a Canadian
export restriction on raw logs, which effectively reduced the
price of raw logs to Canadian lumber mills, was an actionable
subsidy to those mills. 30 Although the Commerce ruling was ultimately reversed on other grounds, a U.S.-Canada binational
31
panel upheld the expansion of the subsidy definition.
27. For an account of the origins of the U.S. doctrine, see James D.
Southwick, The Lingering Problem with the Specificity Test in United States
CountervailingDuty Law, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1159 (1988).
28. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2, in GAIT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 264, GATT Sales No.
1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Subsidies Code].
29. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 14 I.T.R.D. (BNA)
2166, 2224-2237 (May 28, 1992) (the third CVD action involving a long-standing complaint about imports of softwood lumber from Canada).
30. The change had been adumbrated in a somewhat earlier decision by
the Commerce Department, Leather from Argentina, 13 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1095,
1096 (Oct. 2, 1990).
31. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 16 I.T.R.D. 1168
(BNA) (May 6, 1993). The decision of the Commerce Department was appealed
to a binational panel constituted under Chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement. Id. The binational panel accepted the "subsidy" classification of the export ban by a 3-2 decision, but remanded asking for further elaboration on the issues of "specificity" and "direct and discernable effect." Id. The
Commerce Department elaborated on and affirmed its original findings. 1993
FTAPD LEXIS 10 (Sept. 17, 1993). On a second appeal, the binational panel
found the elaborated "specificity" finding still insufficient and remanded with
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Shortly after it was announced, the broad new subsidy concept articulated in Softwood Lumber III appeared to have been
rejected by the new GATT definition of "subsidy" in the Uruguay
Round Subsidies Code. 3 2 The new GATT definition limited the
subsidy concept to measures involving a "financial contribution
by a government."33 Indeed, even the Commerce Department
opinion in Softwood Lumber III seemed to concede that the
broader definition of subsidy it adopted in that case
was in con34
flict with the new GATT definition, then in draft
In ratifying the Uruguay Round Subsidy Code, however, the
U.S. Congress made clear that it wanted the new GATT definition of "subsidy" to be interpreted as including and affirming the
broader concept of regulatory subsidy employed in Softwood
Lumber III. The consistency of Congress's position with the new
GATT definition cannot be determined authoritatively without
a comprehensive review of the negotiating. history of the new
definition, the documentation for which is still restricted, 3 5 but
the U.S. law itself is now quite clear.
orders to dismiss the proceeding. 1993 FTAPD LEXIS 15 (Dec. 17, 1993). That
remand order was affirmed by an Extraordinary Challenge Committee, Panel
No. ECC-94-1904-01 USA, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11 (Aug. 3, 1994), and the Commerce Department's countervailing duty order was dismissed, 59 Fed. Reg.
42,029 (Aug. 16, 1994).
32. 1994 Subsidies Code, supra note 28, at art. 1.
33. Id.
34. The Commerce decision took note of the unadopted text of the new
GATT definition, conceded that it was in conflict with the new definition of subsidy being adopted in that case, and actually sought to use the changes made by
the draft GATT text as proof that the definition of "subsidy" in the older version
of the Subsidies Code then in force (the Tokyo Round version) must not have
been similarly limited. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, supra
note 29, at 2235.
35. The full text of the new GATT definition reads as follows:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist
if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public
body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as
"government"), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g.
grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds
or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of
functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested
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Is this evolving U.S. definition of "subsidy" broad enough to
include the cost advantage created by low environmental standards? Probably not. The current definition in U.S. law includes financial benefits businesses receive from private sources,
but only those benefits arising from government action that "entrusts or directs a private entity to make a financial contribuin the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments; or
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994; and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
1994 Subsidies Code, supra note 28, at art. 1.1 (footnote omitted).
Congress enacted a considerably modified version of the GATT definition
into U.S. countervailing duty law. The text of Article 1.1 (a)(1)(iv) of the 1994
Subsidies Code came out as:
[an authority] makes a payment to a funding mechanism to provide a
financial contribution, or entrusts or directs a private entity to make a
financial contribution, if providing the contribution would normally be
vested in the government and the practice does not differ in substance
from practices normally followed by governments.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 251, 108 Stat. 4809,
4902 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(iii)).
According to the House conference report for the Act, Congress interpreted
subsection 5(B)(iii) to cover any situation where "government took or imposed
(through statutory, regulatory or administrative action) a formal, enforceable
measure which directly led to a discernible benefit being provided to the industry under investigation." H.R. REP.No. 826, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 108-09
(1994). According to the Senate Finance Committee report, "the Committee intends that the term entrusts or directs shall be interpreted broadly to prevent
the 'indirect' provision of a subsidy from becoming a harmful loophole to effective enforcement of the countervailing duty law." S. REP. No. 412, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess., 91 (1994). Both reports explicitly affirm the definition of "subsidy" in
Softwood Lumber III. Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 826, supra, at 108-09.
The GATT text itself appears to limit "private" subsidies to cases where
private bodies are dispensing benefits in the same manner as would a government agency. To be sure, governments have often given subsidies by selling
raw material inputs below fair market value. An export restriction will usually
force private sellers to reduce their price below what it would otherwise be.
Whether the resulting reduced-price sale "in no real sense differs from practices
normally followed by governments" is debatable. Interestingly, the U.S. implementing legislation struck "in no real sense differs" and substituted "does not
differ in substance."
As well as can be determined from available negotiating records, the negotiators appear to have agreed to disagree about the meaning of the term "financial contribution," adopting that text without resolving their differences.
Several months after the term "financial contribution" had been established in
a July 1990 chairman's draft, the EEC and others were insisting the term
should require an actual charge on the public account, while the United States
was still holding to an earlier position that the definition had to include "any
government action or combination of government actions which confers a benefit on the recipient firm(s)." 1 THE GATT URUGUAY RouND: A NEGOTIATING HisTORY (1986-1992) 861, 873, 898-899, 967 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
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Additionally, according to the House conference report,
private subsidies require "a formal, enforceable [government]
measure which directly [leads] to a discernable benefit."3 7 An
export restriction fits within this definition because it is a concrete government measure usually intended to lower the domestic market price of the product being exported. Weak
environmental laws, however, involve no government action as
such. The financial benefit to producers, if any, arises from government inaction rather than action. Moreover, the financial
benefit has no identifiable transferor, public or private. In sum,
a definition that treated the absence of regulation as a subsidy
a benefit measured by the cost of what some other government decides the regulation should have been - would carry
the concept of "subsidy" to a new and different level.
Nonetheless, the recent action of the U.S. Congress indicates that the legal definition of subsidy is still unsettled. Both
in GATT and in U.S. law, the present legal definition of subsidy
consists of arbitrary lines drawn around a rather loose concept
of a government-generated benefit. The underlying concept of
subsidy can always be extended to cover any additional unfair
benefits that political leaders want to countervail. Only a widespread awareness that broader definitions will at some point become self-destructive holds the more limited definitions in place.
tion."36

B.

Low ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AS DUMPING

Current antidumping laws define dumping to include sustained sales at prices below the average cost of production.
When dumped imports materially injure a domestic industry,
governments may levy an antidumping duty equal to the "margin of dumping" - the amount by which the import price falls
below the true cost of production plus profit. If goods produced
under low environmental standards can be viewed as goods being sold for less than their true cost of production, antidumping
laws may provide a mechanism to impose eco-duties.
Environmental policy literature endorses the idea that
goods produced under inadequate environmental standards
should be viewed as goods manufactured at prices below the
true costs of production.3 8 The cost of the environmental resources appropriated by the pollution-causing production pro36. 19 U.S.C. 1677 (5)(B)(iii) (1994).
37. H.R. REP. No. 826, supra note 35, at 108-09.
38. MICHAEL JACOBS, THE GREEN ECONOMY: ENVIRONMENT, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND THE POLITICS OF THE FUTURE xv-xvii (1991); DAVID W.
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cess is not reflected in the price of such goods. Indeed, one of the
most widely advocated reforms in this area is the proposal to
create a legal framework requiring that such goods reflect their
39
true cost.
To the author's knowledge, no national antidumping law
currently allows an action for environmental dumping. For the
most part, current laws determine costs of production based on
the producer's own data. "Cost" has meant the actual costs of
the kind that businesses and tax collectors record.
As is true of the subsidy concept, however, the history of
legal definition in this area suggests possibilities for growth.
Some precedent exists for imposing fictitious costs where legislators believe they ought to be recognized. Until recently, U.S.
antidumping law imposed an eight percent profit charge and a
ten percent overheads charge when calculating the cost of imports, regardless of whether the producer actually incurred
these costs. 40 Moreover, the antidumping law of most countries
allows administrators to calculate hypothetical costs and prices
for imports from non-market economies. 4 1 It would hardly be
unprecedented, therefore, if a country amended its antidumping
law to include a statutory environmental compliance cost, calculated from the same sort of arbitrary general average data as the
eight percent profits and ten percent overhead items.
At the moment, however, the policy trend appears to be
moving against imposing such fictitious costs. The 1994 Uruguay Round revision of the GATT Antidumping Code seeks to
preclude governments from using the sort of arbitrary profit and
overhead figures just described. The 1994 Antidumping Code
provides that "costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of
records kept by producers," and that cost and overhead expenses
"shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales
...by the exporter or producer under investigation." 4 2 In reR. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
3-28 (1990).
Jacobs, supra note 38, at 62-70; PEARCE AND TURNER, supra note 38, at

PEARCE AND
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39.
120-90.
40. In the pre-1994 version of U.S. antidumping law, these provisions were
found at 19 U.S.C. 1677b (e)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (1980).
41. For the current U.S. provision governing products from nonmarket
economies see 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c) (1994). See also William P. Alford, When is
China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping and
CountervailingDuty Laws of the United States to China and other "Nonmarket
Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1987).
42. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreements
on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature April 15, 1994, arts. 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2,
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sponse, the United States removed the statutory rates for profit
43
and overhead from its antidumping law.
At the present time, therefore, both national antidumping
laws and the law of GATT seem to preclude using antidumping
laws to remedy the level-playing-field complaint against low environmental standards. The idea of treating environmental degradation as a cost of production has by no means lost its appeal,
however. As in the case of anti-subsidies law, the final answer
to these questions has yet to be written.
V. FAIRNESS REVISITED:
CAN DIFFERENCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS BE JUSTIFIED ON OTHER
NORMATIVE GROUNDS?
The level playing field metaphor reflects a rather simpleminded concept of fairness. As usually applied, its standard is
the equality of competitive conditions: competition is only fair
when all conditions are equal.
In most discourse about international trade, however, experts agree that some differences in competitive conditions between countries are both natural and proper, and that trade
outcomes determined by these differences are consequently "legitimate." Those who accept the legitimacy of such differences
in competitive conditions include free trade economists at one
end of the spectrum and dedicated disciples of unfair trade laws
at the other. The willingness to accept differences suggests that
there are more sophisticated concepts of fairness that may eventually displace simple level-playing-field norms - concepts that
may produce a normative framework for trade that allows for at
least some national differences in environmental regulatory
standards.
A.

LEGITIMATE DIFFERENCES IN GENERAL

Both in free trade economic theory and in the "fairness"
rhetoric of modern U.S. trade law, competitive advantages arising from certain physical differences between countries are universally considered as a fair and proper basis of international
trade. Economists call them factor endowments. Natural adreprintedin

UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL TEXTS OF THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 168 (1994).

43. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 224 (e)(2)(B)(iii), Pub. L. No. 103465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4884 (1994).
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vantages such as the fertility of soil, climate, rainfall, available
raw materials, and transportation facilities such as deep
harbors and navigable rivers fall into this category. Economists
assert that nations increase their economic welfare when they
trade according to the comparative advantages stemming from
such differences. The priests of fairness doctrine also bless the
competitive results of these natural differences - a position not
entirely consistent with their usual emphasis on awarding victory to the better competitor, but one seemingly hammered into
them by 150 years of indoctrination by David Ricardo.
At the next level, both free trade economists and fair trade
advocates bless the competitive advantages arising from certain
societal differences between nations, such as work habits, savings rate, education, and efficient government. For economists,
these qualities also determine a nation's comparative advantages, and therefore basing trade upon these qualities increases
welfare. Fair traders also seem to accept the competitive advantages created by these social differences because they are part of
the package of virtues that distinguish good competitors from
poor competitors.
This attitude toward natural advantages seems to legitimize at least one kind of difference in national environmental
policies. If a country's natural physical advantages allow it to
achieve the same level of environmental quality with less rigorous regulation, the cost advantage from less rigorous standards
is fair. For example, a country with fast-running, self-cleaning
rivers that retains good quality water despite less stringent controls deserves the resultant cost advantage. Similarly, economists and fair traders would likely endorse cost savings gained
from less rigorous air pollution standards in a country with
fewer smokestacks and more trees. Additionally, lower environmental standards made possible by superior social behavior,
such as recycling, auto speed limits, or turning down thermostats, would probably be accepted as well.
The national differences that cause the greatest disagreement are lower environmental standards that produce lower
levels of environmental quality. At this point, the normative
claims of free trade economists and fair-traders diverge. Each,
however, offers an analytical framework in which some difference in environmental regulatory standards can be viewed as
legitimate.
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A FAIR-TRADER'S APPROACH TO LEGITIMATE DIFFERENCES

Fair trade advocates appear willing to accept lower levels of
environmental regulation to the extent they can somehow be
characterized as "natural" (like the self-cleaning river example)
rather than "artificial" (like cash subsidies from the government). Consider the following policy statement by the Clinton
Administration on trade-and-environment:
The Administration is not seeking guidelines on the level of minimum
wages, nor health and safety standards that are not appropriate to a
country's level of development .... But at the same time, no country
should seek to gain or maintain a comparative advantage or otherwise
distort competitive conditions
by maintaining artificially low labor or
44
environmental standards.

The distinction between "low" and "artificially low" is not
immediately clear. The idea that lower environmental standards are legitimate because they are "appropriate to a country's
level of development" is equally elusive. The word "artificial"
suggests that environmental standards are acceptable if they result from pure-minded choices based only on environmental factors, as opposed to standards chosen for impure competitive
business reasons. The reference to "development" suggests a
similar distinction; low standards due to a lack of development
are legitimate, whereas low standards based on competitive ag45
gression are invalid.
The thought that poor countries in particular can adopt environmental policies absent any competitive motivation seems
particularly fanciful. To be sure, some kinds of pollution result
from a lack of public funds for things like sanitation, but this is
44. Proposed SAA Language on Labor, Environment and Fast Track, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 12, 1994, at S-7.

45. Few writers escape unscathed after wrestling with this concept of legitimacy. For example:
Where differences in environmental policy choices reflect variations in
climate, weather patterns, existing pollution levels, population density, economic needs, and risk preferences and where any environmental impacts are confined to local harm, the divergent standards may be
considered legitimate - and therefore an inappropriate target for unilateral ecoduties or other efforts to adjust for policy differences.
Where, however, the strategic environmental behavior results in
pollution that spills over onto others, the difference in standards
should be considered illegitimate, thereby making resort to ecoduties
potentially appropriate.
EsTy, supra note 22, at 157 (emphasis added).
The distinction between local and transborder harm is clear enough, but
those are distinctions of environmental policy. The intriguing distinction is the
one between the first category of "legitimate" variations and the second category of "strategic environmental behavior."
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not the type of low environmental standard that countries like
the United States complain about. The primary complaint
against developing countries involves lower environmental standards that reduce manufacturing costs. When a manufacturer
is spared the cost of higher environmental standards because of
its country's stage of development or level of poverty, the reason
is a commercial one; it is simply that the lower costs created by
lower standards will preserve the manufacturer's competitive
position, thus preserving and expanding that manufacturer's
useful economic activity. Development reasons are commercial
reasons.
On reflection, this rather ill-defined acceptance of differences in developing-country environmental standards appears
to be nothing more than an effort to accord some margin of tolerance to poor countries. This is the same normative presumption
that underlies government economic assistance to poor countries. Existing assistance programs, such as those that offer tax
benefits for investors, often create competitive advantages for
producers in beneficiary countries. A willingness to overlook
less rigorous pollution controls suggests the same normative response to poverty.
As such, the fair trader's tolerance for weaker environmental regulation in developing countries is probably not based on
any principled distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" differences in environmental policy. Rather, this tolerance works like most forms of charity where donors try to
balance between recognizing a moral obligation to help and limiting the donation to the amount they can afford. The balance in
this case will probably depend primarily on two factors.
The first factor involves the amount of commercial injury
resulting from the environmental policy difference. Given that
costs of environmental compliance are usually rather small, the
amount of commercial injury will rarely be significant. The second factor is the amount of environmental damage caused by the
lower standards in question. The more the harm exceeds what
the observer thinks is reasonable, the greater the tendency to
ascribe unworthy commercial motives to the underlying environmental policy.
Unclear though it may be, this fair-trader's view of legitimate differences is potentially very important. The idea has
some staying power in the rough and ready debate of everyday
politics in much the same way as the rather crude idea of "fair-
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ness" itself. If this idea of legitimacy can arm politicians in battle, it deserves further attention.
C.

AN ECONOMIST'S APPROACH TO LEGITIMATE DIFFERENCES

Economic analysis contributes a number of distinctive ideas
to the normative debate over differences in national environmental policy. First, it underlines the fact that environmental
amenities do have opportunity costs. The economist stresses
that local environmental amenities are purchased at the cost of
other government expenditures, increased production costs, or
foregone economic opportunities. By stressing cost, the economic perspective reinforces the intuitive judgment that poor
nations are not able to afford the same level of environmental
amenities. The economist's emphasis on opportunity cost does
not rebut the fairness complaint that the commercial advantage
created by weak environmental policies is somehow "artificial."
Rather, like the fair trader's poverty defense, it suggests the
competing value of the need to give46poor countries greater leeway in using such cost advantages.
Economic analysis sometimes suggests another set of normative justifications for differences in national environmental
policies, based on certain perceptions of legitimacy that attach to
market outcomes. One part of this legitimacy claim might be
called the relativity of market outcomes. The "right" outcome
for every market is the mix of products and prices that yields the
greatest satisfaction to the market participants. Since it is
given that the wants and needs of individual participants always differ, it follows that the optimal outcome for any market
varies according to the wants and needs of its individual participants. "Right" is merely the sum of what the market participants want.
A related legitimacy claim attached to market outcomes
rests on the perception that market outcomes are determined
without overall human guidance. Individuals express their preferences, but the overall result of those preferences is defined
through the invisible hand of the price mechanism. In this
sense, the market functions "naturally." Market outcomes are
not "artificial" in the sense of having been created by government policy.
46. The idea that a developing country cannot "afford" certain environmental standards is a nice way of describing the choice in a way that makes it seem
like there is no choice at all. It is a way of approving the choice by denying the
freedom not to make it.
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Both the relativity of consumer preferences and the perceived neutrality of market processes are used to justify painful
economic outcomes in international trade. Assume, for example,
that consumers in Canada develop an insane attachment to
skim milk. This surge of demand causes an increase in Canadian skim milk production and, with it, a sharp decline in the
price of all the excess Canadian butter manufactured as a byproduct of skim milk production. The low-priced Canadian butter finds its way to export markets where it displaces local U.S.
production. Is this unfair trade? Economists generally decline
to express an opinion about fairness, but few would hesitate to
point out that the result, painful as it may be for U.S. producers,
was merely the product of neutral market forces - just innocent consumer preferences acting in an unguided manner.
Economists looking at national differences in environmental
policy sometimes suggest that such policy differences are another kind of market outcome. The individuals in each country
have preferences regarding the choice between environmental
amenities and the other things that must be given up for them.
The sum of these preferences constitutes the nation's environmental policy. The analogy to market processes seeks to legitimize resulting policy differences as a result of innocent personal
preferences, collated by a neutral, invisible hand. No government is trying to steal jobs from anyone.
Even if one overcomes the many other objections to viewing
environmental policy differences as the product of neutral market forces, 4 7 the market analogy cannot answer the unfairness
complaint. Assuming for the sake of argument that a nation's
environmental policy is the sum of the unguided preferences of
its individual citizens, the individual preferences in question are
still essentially commercial in character. If people in poor countries choose fewer environmental amenities because the cost is
too high, they are doing so because they want to maintain the
competitive conditions that will preserve their jobs. Individuals
in developing countries quite naturally prefer economic benefits
47. The traditional demonstration of optimal market outcomes assumes a
market for private goods in which the participants directly bear the full cost or
receive the full benefit of the goods in question. In the case of a public good like
pollution control, these assumptions cannot be made. The consumer cannot restrict the benefit of the good to him or herself, nor can others who benefit from it
be made to pay for it. As a consequence, environmental economists argue that
the free market alone usually does not call for the correct amount of public
goods, either under-producing because of free riders or over-producing when externalities are shifted to nonconsumers.
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over environmental benefits, but that does not answer the question of whether they won those economic benefits fairly.
In the end, the economist's attention to cost and market
choice undoubtedly sharpens the perception that the economic
cost of environmental policies is relatively higher for poor countries. The ultimate normative thrust of this analysis comes
down to an assertion of the same value that supports the other
claims for legitimacy in this area - the notion that poor countries are to some degree entitled to spend less on environmental
amenities.
D.

WHITHER LEGITIMACY?

The fairness debate goes on. As long as trade policy continues to worship at the shrine of fairness, trade policy advocates
will find it necessary to try to satisfy the relentless demands for
proof that trade is fair. The fact that fairness concepts make no
sense in international trade matters will not excuse the need to
employ them.
In this second-best sort of policy debate, it is somewhat comforting to know that there are a few standards of legitimacy that
can go beyond the ruthless equality of the level playing field.
There seems to be some mileage in the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" differences in competitive conditions.
Although the distinction does not provide a wholly convincing
justification for different environmental standards, the ideas are
fluid enough to provide a normative cover to other competing
values. Things that are perceived as fair also tend to be perceived as natural. The perception that poor countries are entitled to employ lower standards slides easily into the idea that
lower standards are natural, normal, unguided, and unaggressive. Both fair traders and economists are able to wrap their
altruistic values in such normative dress. The fact that such
claims do not withstand analysis may be less interesting than
the fact that they seem to work anyway.
A story is told that during the early days of World War II,
German camouflage experts tried to lure British bombers away
from German airfields by constructing fake airfields, using
wood-and-canvass mock-ups of aircraft and buildings. One day
the Royal Air Force discovered the deception. The next day RAF
bombers flew over and dropped wooden bombs on the canvass
airplanes.
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CONCLUSION

If politics were completely rational, there would be little
reason to be concerned about level-playing-field claims against
imports from countries with weak environmental standards.
The size of the commercial advantage in such cases is usually
too small to generate serious business concerns. Because of the
importance attached to fairness complaints in today's trade policy environment, however, there is always temptation for industries to throw in level-playing-field complaints when they seek
protection from imports or oppose new environmental standards. And while legislators themselves may be skeptical about
these complaints, no one ever lost an election by coming down on
the side of fairness. As a result, level-playing-field complaints
about weak environmental policies remain on the trade agenda.
Policy debate cannot completely answer these fairness complaints because the normative concepts that underlie the notions of fairness in this debate are simply not coherent when
applied to international trade relations. No one knows whether
any playing field is truly level, nor does anyone know how to
make it level. Instead, the present system of unfair trade laws
seems to be held in check by nothing more than a rather vague
sense of restraint. We have suggested an implicit policy settlement here - a settlement under which we remedy certain
highly visible fairness claims in exchange for accepting a generally liberal trade policy, with the reservation that fairness
claims will not threaten the main contours of that liberal policy.
The sense of restraint sometimes bends before important political needs, but it remains effective and is likely to endure so long
as countries have major investments in open world markets.
The debate over level-playing-field claims is likely to continue as long as fairness claims exert some political leverage. As
long as they do, those who defend trade with developing countries will have to reply. In the current debate, there does seem
to be an effort in many quarters to find a normative justification
for at least some differences in national environmental policies.
Granted that the underlying normative concepts in this area are
not wholly coherent, it still seems worthwhile to encourage further investment in analysis - or perhaps, better, artistry - to
bring these different strands together into some kind of politically effective policy response.

